The complex challenge that is Afghanistan was simplified in the minds of most Americans and policy makers after 9/11. The reaction was assertive, but not ultimately decisive. A very rough summary of the war in Afghanistan could read:
Phase I 2001-2002
JSOC, USASOC, Intelligence Community assets engage, empower and direct warring Tajik, Uzbek and some Pashtun parties to remove the unstable and brittle Taliban Regime from Key terrain. Taliban groups are removed from their position as the diffuse but official governing authority of Afghanistan.
Phase II 2002-2009
The rapid disintegration of authoritative structures built by Taliban groups since 1996 is power vacuum. Attending parties develop a transitional agreement at Bonn Conference that attempts to establish a transitional authority that can stabilize the country while developing more durable and representative institutions. This period is marked by an "economy of force" approach by US forces. The decisive SOCOM/INTEL community assets are redirected out of Afghanistan and retrained for operations in Iraq. 2002-2004 former warlords and power brokers pushed out by Taliban are returned to power by a series of power sharing agreements between Karzai government in Kabul and local leaders in the districts. By 2006 Taliban begins to reform to address the preexisting civilian grievances resulting from GIRoA/Warlord abuses. Shadow governments reemerge.
Phase III 2009-2012
President Obama identifies US interest in Afghanistan to be reducing AQ operational capabilities within the country in addition to regional stabilization considerations associated with the importance of Pakistan. President determines that US strategy will be to develop durable national and local institutions capable of stabilizing key terrain in Afghanistan. The effort is resourced with an increase the number of ANSF trainers, combat capable conventional troops, unconventional warfare Special Operations Troops, Hunter/Killer Intelligence assets, stabilization/reconstruction development programs and diplomatic resources. US forces are currently simultaneously attempting to retake areas lost between 2002-2008 while attempting to stabilize and empower local governance in areas that have been deemed key terrain by US commanders.
Phase IV 2012-?
The US will begin to downsize the number of combat capable units in Afghanistan. The ultimate determination of what level of engagement will be resourced in the region will depend on developments in the security situation interacting with US policy maker perceptions of the relative prioritization of Afghanistan on national security interests.
There is another method of balancing US interests in complex conflicts. Fortunately the US response to failed states, insurgencies and terrorist groups does not have to be a massive conventional military intervention. The US has, with varying degrees of success, engaged in a more measured approach in Thailand, Philippines, The Horn of Africa and others. The approach involves using a more balanced measure of US tools of engagement spanning the range from
- Civil Engagement
- Development
- Social Networking (not Facebook but actual relationship building)
- Economic engagement
- Professional training
- Legal/law enforcement programs
- Military engagement
- Host Nation Military Advising, training, equipping,
- Special Operations Training, Advising
- Intelligence Sharing
- Intel Gathering
- Information Operations
- Influence operations
- Key person Target tracking
- Apprehension
- Kinetic operations (killing people and breaking their stuff)
In Afghanistan, policy makers are just discovering that the complex environment requires complex approaches to addressing the range of issues/desired outcomes. Fortunately (partly because of the lack of wide public outcry) places like the Philippines have been engaged with this approach for longer. It seems that massive public desire for a US government "response" to a terrorist act doesn't yield good policy or good outcomes. Even in policy environments where there is a wave of support for ineffective approaches to US security (2002-2004) the Philippine example shows there is room to do good on the fringes.
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